Islamic State Operations and Iraqi Fault Lines
Watkins, Andrew
Islamic State Operations and Iraqi Fault Lines / [Recurso electrónico] PDF .-- Recurso online
During the offensive by Islamic State militants that began in early June 2014, the group parlayed tactical advantages into significant territorial gains. Its use of multidirectional, vehicle-borne assaults made it seem as though Islamic State fighters were ubiquitous.[1] The speed of these attacks threw Iraqi security forces (ISF) on their heels and allowed the militant group to capture land and weapons as state security forces withdrew. The Islamic State also succeeded in slowing the organization of an ISF counteroffensive by planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along roads and in houses.[2] While these tactical successes have been discussed extensively by a number of Iraq analysts, the broader geopolitical context in which they took place requires further analysis.
Estado Islámico
Irak
Islamic State Operations and Iraqi Fault Lines / [Recurso electrónico] PDF .-- Recurso online
During the offensive by Islamic State militants that began in early June 2014, the group parlayed tactical advantages into significant territorial gains. Its use of multidirectional, vehicle-borne assaults made it seem as though Islamic State fighters were ubiquitous.[1] The speed of these attacks threw Iraqi security forces (ISF) on their heels and allowed the militant group to capture land and weapons as state security forces withdrew. The Islamic State also succeeded in slowing the organization of an ISF counteroffensive by planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along roads and in houses.[2] While these tactical successes have been discussed extensively by a number of Iraq analysts, the broader geopolitical context in which they took place requires further analysis.
Estado Islámico
Irak
