Revising the History of al-Qa`ida’s original ,meeting with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi [Recurso electrónico] PDF
Material type:
ArticleDescription: Recurso onlineSubject(s): Online resources:
In:
CTC Sentinel CTC Sentinel . -- Vol. 9 Issue 10 (Oct. 2016) p. 28-35Summary: In 2005, al-Qa`ida’s one-time security chief Saif al-`Adl
chronicled a key period in the Islamic State’s origin story—the
initial engagement between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
and Usama bin Ladin in 1999. His history, which describes
al-Qa`ida agreeing to help al-Zarqawi establish a
training camp near Herat without demanding al-Zarqawi
swear allegiance to bin Ladin, is a seminal text in our understanding
of the Islamic State’s history. But how reliable
is the story? Even though most analysts believe the
account was genuinely written by al-`Adl, bin Ladin was so
unhappy with its contents he called it a fraud. And newly
available jihadist documents suggest al-Qa`ida’s rationale
for supporting al-Zarqawi was more complex and more
Machiavellian than al-`Adl, or bin Ladin, ever admitted.
Analíticas
| Cover image | Item type | Current library | Home library | Collection | Shelving location | Call number | Materials specified | Vol info | URL | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | Item hold queue priority | Course reserves | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Centro de Análisis y Prospectiva de la Guardia Civil | Biblioteca Digital | Available | 2017320 |
In 2005, al-Qa`ida’s one-time security chief Saif al-`Adl
chronicled a key period in the Islamic State’s origin story—the
initial engagement between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
and Usama bin Ladin in 1999. His history, which describes
al-Qa`ida agreeing to help al-Zarqawi establish a
training camp near Herat without demanding al-Zarqawi
swear allegiance to bin Ladin, is a seminal text in our understanding
of the Islamic State’s history. But how reliable
is the story? Even though most analysts believe the
account was genuinely written by al-`Adl, bin Ladin was so
unhappy with its contents he called it a fraud. And newly
available jihadist documents suggest al-Qa`ida’s rationale
for supporting al-Zarqawi was more complex and more
Machiavellian than al-`Adl, or bin Ladin, ever admitted.
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