Between Supranationalism and Inter-Governmentalism in the European Union’s Foreign Policy [Recurso electronico] PDF : A Principal Agent Approach of the Sanction Policy in the CFSP Framework
Material type:
ArticleISSN: - 2386-9453
Analíticas
| Cover image | Item type | Current library | Home library | Collection | Shelving location | Call number | Materials specified | Vol info | URL | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | Item hold queue priority | Course reserves | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Centro de Análisis y Prospectiva de la Guardia Civil | Biblioteca Digital | Available | 2017565 |
Integration in the EU Foreign Policy domain has been sporadic, preventing the EU from gaining traction
internationally. However, the imposition of international sanctions has generated a great degree of member state
cooperation at the EU level. From establishing a common sanctioning practice, to institutionalising the
instrument as part of the CFSP toolbox, the EU sanction policy constitutes a fascinating example of delegation
of foreign policy powers from the national to the supranational level. This article uses the Principal-Agent
model in an attempt to make evident, as a result from the allocation of such powers to the EU, the power
struggle between the national and supranational levels for the control of the sanction-making process. The
analysis reveals that in spite of EU supranational bodies acquiring greater control over time, the member states
have set up control mechanisms in order to limit the room for manoeuvre of the former.
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