000			01471nab a22001697a 4500
008			120229t xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaBCA _cES-MaBCA
100			_913563 _aWatkins, Andrew
245			_aIslamic State Operations and Iraqi Fault Lines _h[Recurso electrónico] PDF
300			_aRecurso online
520			_aDuring the offensive by Islamic State militants that began in early June 2014, the group parlayed tactical advantages into significant territorial gains. Its use of multidirectional, vehicle-borne assaults made it seem as though Islamic State fighters were ubiquitous.[1] The speed of these attacks threw Iraqi security forces (ISF) on their heels and allowed the militant group to capture land and weapons as state security forces withdrew. The Islamic State also succeeded in slowing the organization of an ISF counteroffensive by planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along roads and in houses.[2] While these tactical successes have been discussed extensively by a number of Iraq analysts, the broader geopolitical context in which they took place requires further analysis.
610		0	_912870 _aEstado Islámico
651		0	_91852 _aIrak
773	0		_6https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/islamic-state-operations-and-iraqi-fault-lines _aCTC Sentinel _g. -- Vol. 8 Issue 5 (May 2015) p. 17-19 _iEn : _tCTC Sentinel _w4458
856	4		_uhttps://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/islamic-state-operations-and-iraqi-fault-lines _qPDF
942			_2udc _cAN
999			_c16886 _d16889