000			01974nab a22001697a 4500
008			120229t xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaBCA _cES-MaBCA
100			_95112 _aAdelkhah, Nima
245			_aIran’s Changing Regional Strategy and Its Implications for the Region _h[Recurso electrónico] PDF
300			_aRecurso online
520			_aIn a typical gesture of defiance, which has signified allegiance to Iran’s revolutionary credentials since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, General Abdullah Araqi, the lieutenant commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated the following at a public event in early May: “Today, the world arrogance [the United States] is present in the region, has deployed its warships in the Persian Gulf and has military bases in the regional states, but we are not afraid of this presence and its so-called options on the table” (Fars News, May 7). While this show of defiance may have Iranians as the main target audience, Araqi’s statement also says something central about how Iran perceives its core national interest: standing firm against a U.S. military presence in the region, which it views as an existential threat to the Islamic Republic. Beyond ideology, Iran’s regional policy is driven by fears of a U.S. invasion or a U.S.-orchestrated military attack by a regional power, with Iran’s nuclear sites as the main target. In an attempt to diminish the prospects of a military attack, Tehran has, in recent years, adopted several regional strategies that are intended to contain this perceived threat.
650		0	_93228 _aEstrategias de seguridad
651		0	_91262 _aIrán
773	0		_6http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue10_03.pdf _aTerrorism Monitor _g. -- Vol. XIII Issue 10 (May 2015) p. 8-10 _iEn : _tTerrorism Monitor _w4338
856	4		_uhttp://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue10_03.pdf _qPDF
942			_2udc _cAN
999			_c16901 _d16904