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040			_cES-MaBCA
100			_913939 _aCarnegie, Paul J.
245			_aCountering the (Re-) Production of Militancy in Indonesia _h[Recurso electrónico] PDF _b: between Coercion and Persuasion
260			_bAlex P Schmid _c2007
520			_aIn the early 2000s, Indonesia witnessed a proliferation of Islamist paramilitary groups and terror activity in the wake of Suharto’s downfall. Having said this, over the years since Suharto’s downfall, the dire threat predictions have largely failed to materialize at least strategically. This outcome raises some interesting questions about the ways in which Indonesian policy responded to the security threat posed by Islamist militancy. Drawing on Temby’s thesis about Darul Islam and Negara Islam Indonesia and combining this with Colombijn and Lindblad’s concept of ‘reservoirs of violence’, the following article argues that countering the conditioning factors underlying militancy and the legacy of different ‘imagined de-colonizations’ is critical for degrading militant threats (especially Islamist ones) in Indonesia. Persistent and excessive punitive action by the state is counterproductive in the long run. It runs too high a risk of antagonizing and further polarizing oppositional segments of the population. That in turn perpetuates a ‘ghettoized’ sense of enmity and alienation amongst them towards the state and wider society. By situating localized responses to the problem in historical context, the following underscores the importance of preventative persuasion measures for limiting the reproduction of militancy in Indonesia.
650		0	_91670 _aIslamismo
650		0	_91738 _aTerrorismo _xPrevención
651		0	_91261 _aIndonesia
773	0		_aPerspectives on Terrorism _g. -- Vol. 9 No. 5 (Oct. 2015) p. 15-26 _iEn : _tPerspectives on Terrorism _w1101 _x2334-3745
856	4		_qPDF _uhttp://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/458/908
942			_2udc _cAN
999			_c17535 _d17538