000			02115nab a22002297a 4500
003			ES-MaBCA
005			20160822134530.0
008			120808t xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a2334-3745
040			_cES-MaBCA
100			_914258 _aKirchofer, Charles
245			_aTargeted Killings and Compellence _h[Recurso electrónico] PDF _b: Lessons from the Campaign against Hamas in the Second Intifada
260			_b Alex P. Schmid _c2016
520			_aThere is little consensus among scholars on whether targeted killings of members of terrorist and militant groups work, though some have argued that they do, at least under certain circumstances. Most of the work so far has focused on the ability of targeted killings to disrupt targeted groups’ ability to function. In many cases, work has centered on whether they work and not addressed how they work if they do. There has been insufficient study of the coercive effects of targeted killings and these studies have often produced mixed results, with violence sometimes increasing and sometimes decreasing after targeted strikes. This article argues that the focus on disruption and a failure to differentiate between deterrence and compellence and properly to account for the timing of attacks may be at least partly to blame for the mixed record observed from the use of targeted killings. It asserts that targeted killings are inherently compellent and can therefore only be used to change a status quo and potentially establish new “rules of the game.” They cannot be used to deter (i.e. to maintain current rules). Taking this into account could shed new light on discussions of the appropriateness of targeted killings in given situations and their effectiveness overall.
610		0	_912884 _aHamás
650		0	_91735 _aTerrorismo
650		0	_93228 _aEstrategias de seguridad
651		0	_91264 _aIsrael
773	0		_aPerspectives on Terrorism _g. -- Vol. 10 No. 3 (June. 2016) _iEn : _tPerspectives on Terrorism _w1101 _x2334-3745
856	4		_qPDF _uhttp://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/510/1010
942			_2udc _cAN
999			_c18309 _d18312