000			02038nab a22001817a 4500
008			120229t xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaBCA _cES-MaBCA
100			_913754 _aHallberg Tønnessen, Truls
245			_aDestroying the Islamic State Hydra _h[Recurso electrónico] PDF _b: lessons Learned from the Fall of its Predecessor
300			_aRecurso online
520			_aThe severe weakening between 2008 and 2011 of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the name al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) had given itself in 2006, provides lessons for the current campaign against its successor, the Islamic State. The key to the earlier success was the United States’ ability to win the support of Sunni Arab tribes. This dynamic has proven more difcult to achieve today for a variety of reasons, including a lack of U.S. troops on the ground to temper discord and distrust between Shi`a-dominated Baghdad and the Sunnis as well as the decision not to confront Assad militarily in Syria. In addition, the Islamic State has been much more successful in monopolizing power in its core area than AQI/ISI ever was. Nevertheless, the most important reason for the eventual Sunni backlash against ISI—its brutal attempt to dominate Sunnis—is a dynamic still present in areas under Islamic State control today, providing an opportunity for the coalition to shrink the Sunni support base on which the group depends. But the radicalization of a generation by war and Islamic State brainwashing means that unless the underlying root causes of Sunni disenfranchisement are addressed and even if the Islamic State is defeated militarily in the coming months and years, the group could reemerge in new forms.
650		0	_913909 _aEstado Islámico
650		0	_91745 _aTerrorismo internacional
650		0	_91181 _aAnalisis de inteligencia
773	0		_aCTC Sentinel _g. -- Vol. 9 Issue 8 (Aug. 2016) p. 1-6 _iEn : _tCTC Sentinel _w4458
856	4		_uhttps://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss810.pdf _qPDF
942			_2udc _cAN
999			_c18556 _d18559