000			01313nab a22001697a 4500
008			120229t xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaBCA _cES-MaBCA
100			_94520 _aShapiro, Jacob N.
245			_aA Predictable Failure _h[Recurso electrónico] PDF _b: the Political Economy of the Decline of the Islamic State
300			_aRecurso online
520			_aThe Islamic State’s failure as a state was predictable as soon as the group’s initial advances stalled. The group tried to fight a three-front war for territory—Kurds to the North, the Assad regime to the West, and Iraq to the East—without the necessary resources to do so. Early revenue estimates revealed that either its revenue-generation system was inefcient, its economy had collapsed, or both, and that conditions had steadily worsened over time. The area it controlled in late 2014 was only modestly productive before the war and its governing institutions were inimical to economic growth. These factors guaranteed a slow collapse.
610		0	_912870 _aEstado Islámico
650	0	0	_99946 _aEconomía política
773	0		_aCTC Sentinel _g. -- Vol. 9 Issue 9 (Sept. 2016) p. 28-32 _iEn : _tCTC Sentinel _w4458
856	4		_uhttps://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss95.pdf _qPDF
942			_2udc _cAN
999			_c18562 _d18565