000			02047nam a22002417a 4500
003			ES-MaBCA
005			20161114123615.0
008			150225b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a978-92-823-9283-6
024			_2doi _a10.2861/506928
040			_aES-MaBCA _cES-MaBCA
110			_9722 _aInstitute for Security Studies
245			_aEU strategic communications _h[Recurso electrónico]PDF _b: With a view to counteracting propaganda
260			_bPublications Office _cMay 2016
300			_a35 p. _fRecurso online
520			_aEmanating from Russia in the east and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the south, the EU has been increasingly hit by destabilising messages amounting – in different forms and to different degrees – to coherent hostile ‘strategic communications’ campaigns, or the processes of infusing communications activities with an agenda or plan to impact the behaviour of a target audience. Both Russia and ISIL have engaged in aggressive messaging and deceptive media campaigns, albeit with distinct narratives, targets and audiences. This paper analyses the ‘what’ and the ‘how’: the respective narratives of each actor, their specificities, their similarities and their differences. The analysis also draws attention to strategic communications efforts undertaken by the EU, which are vectored into defensive (react and respond) and offensive (probe and push) dimensions. This understanding of the present context finally allows for an evaluation of what actions can be taken to enhance the effectiveness of the EU’s own strategic communications
610		0	_912870 _aEstado Islámico _xPropaganda
650		0	_92424 _aSistemas de gestión _xComunicación _zPaíses de la Unión Europea
651		0	_91448 _aRusia _xPropaganda
710			_93235 _aParlamento Europeo _b. Asuntos Exteriores
856	4		_uhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578008/EXPO_IDA(2016)578008_EN.pdf _y *DESCARGAR PDF*
942			_2udc _cBK _kBoletín UE _mJunio 2016
999			_c18790 _d18793