000			01606nab a22002057a 4500
008			120229t xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaBCA _cES-MaBCA
100			_95119 _aFishman, Brian
245			_aRevising the History of al-Qa`ida’s original ,meeting with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi _h[Recurso electrónico] PDF
300			_aRecurso online
520			_aIn 2005, al-Qa`ida’s one-time security chief Saif al-`Adl chronicled a key period in the Islamic State’s origin story—the initial engagement between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Usama bin Ladin in 1999. His history, which describes al-Qa`ida agreeing to help al-Zarqawi establish a training camp near Herat without demanding al-Zarqawi swear allegiance to bin Ladin, is a seminal text in our understanding of the Islamic State’s history. But how reliable is the story? Even though most analysts believe the account was genuinely written by al-`Adl, bin Ladin was so unhappy with its contents he called it a fraud. And newly available jihadist documents suggest al-Qa`ida’s rationale for supporting al-Zarqawi was more complex and more Machiavellian than al-`Adl, or bin Ladin, ever admitted.
650		0	_91745 _aTerrorismo internacional
650		0	_913948 _aAl-Qaeda
650		0	_913909 _aEstado Islámico
650		0	_91181 _aAnalisis de inteligencia
650		0	_91182 _aMetodología de análisis
773	0		_aCTC Sentinel _g. -- Vol. 9 Issue 10 (Oct. 2016) p. 28-35 _iEn : _tCTC Sentinel _w4458
856	4		_uhttps://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss1012.pdf _qPDF
942			_2udc _cAN
999			_c18884 _d18887