000			01893nab a22002177a 4500
003			ES-MaBCA
005			20170228105442.0
008			130527b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a2386-9453
040			_aSpMaBN _bEspañol _cSpMaBN
100			_914598 _aBarbou des Courières, Constance
245			_aBetween Supranationalism and Inter-Governmentalism in the European Union’s Foreign Policy _h[Recurso electronico] PDF _b: A Principal Agent Approach of the Sanction Policy in the CFSP Framework
520			_aIntegration in the EU Foreign Policy domain has been sporadic, preventing the EU from gaining traction internationally. However, the imposition of international sanctions has generated a great degree of member state cooperation at the EU level. From establishing a common sanctioning practice, to institutionalising the instrument as part of the CFSP toolbox, the EU sanction policy constitutes a fascinating example of delegation of foreign policy powers from the national to the supranational level. This article uses the Principal-Agent model in an attempt to make evident, as a result from the allocation of such powers to the EU, the power struggle between the national and supranational levels for the control of the sanction-making process. The analysis reveals that in spite of EU supranational bodies acquiring greater control over time, the member states have set up control mechanisms in order to limit the room for manoeuvre of the former.
650		0	_94271 _aPESC
650		0	_94823 _aDerecho internacional
650		0	_91621 _aSistemas de gestión _xLiderazgo
651		0	_91574 _aPaíses de la Unión Europea
773	0		_aUNISCI Discussion Papers _g. -- N. 43 (enero 2017) p. 9-434 _iEn : _tUNISCI Discussion Papers _w3323 _x2386-9453
856	4		_uhttps://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72408//UNISCIDP43-NUMEROENTERO.pdf
942			_2udc _cAN
999			_c19131 _d19134