000			01589nam a22002057a 4500
005			20180807095852.0
008			120307t xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaBCA _cES-MaBCA
100			_914653 _aSharifi, Arian
245			_aIslamist Groups in Afghanistan and the Strategic Choice of Violence _h[Recurso electrónico] PDF
260			_bUnited States Institute of Peace _c2016 _a1200 17th Street NW Washington, DC 20036
300			_aRecurso online, 4 p.
490			_aUnited States Institute of Peace
520			_aIslamist groups behave much like all other social movement organizations when making strategic choices to contest the power of the state. The decision to use violence is most often the result of rational cost-benefit calculations rather than ideological fanaticism. A group chooses violence as a strategy only when it is motivated and capable of doing so. Motivations and capabilities are in turn determined by three factors: relative access to political power; the nature of government repression; and its access to war-making resources. In Afghanistan, the circumstances suggest a two-pronged reconciliation strategy: to simultaneously reduce safe havens and other support from outside Afghanistan and to increase opportunities for groups sympathetic to the Taliban to hold positions of political power.
650		0	_91905 _aYihad
650		0	_91735 _aTerrorismo
651		0	_9939 _aAfganistán
856	4		_uhttps://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB216-Islamist-Groups-in-Afghanistan-and-the-Strategic-Choice-of-Violence_0.pdf _qPDF
942			_2udc _cBK
999			_c19299 _d19302