| 000 | 01597nab a22002297a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20180807122454.0 | ||
| 008 | 120307t xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaBCA _cES-MaBCA |
||
| 100 |
_915491 _aBinder, Markus K. |
||
| 100 |
_915492 _aQuigley, Jillian M. |
||
| 100 |
_915493 _aTinsley, Herbert F. |
||
| 245 |
_aIslamic State Chemical Weapons _hRecurso electrónico [PDF] _b: A Case Contained by its Context? |
||
| 260 |
_bCTCSentinel _cMar. 2018 |
||
| 300 | _aRecurso online, 5 p. | ||
| 520 | _aWith the July 2017 Sydney hydrogen sulfide plot, there is some evidence that the Islamic State has transferred its chemical warfare (CW) expertise from the battlefield to its foreign terrorism activities. Despite this development, Islamic State appears to put scant organizational stock into the use of CW to advance its strategic goals. Though this lack of enthusiasm cannot be confirmed without secret intelligence or broad primary source data, the Islamic State’s most obvious means of threatening CW attacks—its affiliated propaganda organs—appear to lack any mention of CW events, prowess, or alleged planning. Ultimately, the Islamic State CW experiment seems to predict little about the future of the group’s chemical terrorism. | ||
| 610 | 0 |
_912870 _aEstado Islámico |
|
| 650 | 0 |
_91590 _aArmas químicas |
|
| 650 | 0 |
_91740 _aTerrorismo _xMovimientos extremistas |
|
| 773 |
_aCTC Sentinel _g. -- Vol. 11 Issue 3 (Mar. 2018) p. 27-31. _iEn : _tCTC Sentinel _w4458 |
||
| 856 | _uhttps://ctc.usma.edu/islamic-state-chemical-weapons-case-contained-context/ | ||
| 942 |
_2udc _cAN |
||
| 999 |
_c21206 _d21209 |
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