| 000 | 01971cam a2200205 i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | ES-MaBCA | ||
| 005 | 20181011081950.0 | ||
| 008 | 141107t20142014dcuab b i000 0 eng d | ||
| 020 | _a978-92-64-30246-4 | ||
| 024 |
_2doi _a10.1787/9789264302464-en |
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| 040 |
_beng _cES-MaBCA |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aWhy Do Countries Export Fakes? _b: The Role of Gover nance Framew orks, Enforce ment and Socio‑ec onomic Fact ors _cOECD, EUIPO |
| 260 |
_bOECD _c2018 |
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| 300 | _a67 p. | ||
| 520 | _aTrade in counterfeit goods is a longstanding – and growing – socio-economic threat to effective governance, efficient business and the well-being of consumers worldwide, and is becoming a key source of income for organised criminal groups. It also damages the engine of economic growth, by reducing firms’ revenues and undermining their incentives to innovate. Existing empirical studies, including the recent OECD-EUIPO studies Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact and Mapping the Real Routes of Trade in Fake Goods, have found that counterfeit and pirated products originate from virtually all economies on all continents, although their intensity of involvement varies. Some tend to be important producers or transit points in trade in fake goods, while their neighbours play only marginal roles. This report seeks to answer the question of why some economies are more involved than others. It draws on large datasets to quantify the various socio-economic conditions that determine an economy’s propensity to become an active actor in the trade in fake goods. | ||
| 650 | 0 |
_aFalsificación _94204 |
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| 710 |
_aOrganización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos _95173 |
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| 856 | 4 |
_uhttps://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/reports/Why_do_countries_export_fakes/2018_Why_do_countries_export_fakes_OECD-EUIPO_report_EN.pdf _y *VER DOCUMENTO* |
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| 942 |
_2udc _cBK |
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| 999 |
_c21610 _d21613 |
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