000			00885nam a22002177a 4500
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003			ES-MaBCA
005			20190326123323.0
008			130423b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_cES-MaBCA
100			_914809 _aBentzen, Naja
245			_aUkraine: Religion and (geo-)politics _cNaja Bentzen _h[Recurso electrónico]PDF _b: Orthodox split weakens Russia's influence
260			_aFebruary 2019 _b European Parliamentary Research Service
300			_a8 p. _fRecurso online
490			_vPE 635.525
520			_aFive years after the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople – widely seen as the spiritual leader (primus inter pares) of the Eastern Orthodox world – granted the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) 'autocephaly' on 5 January 2019, formalising a split from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The move follows an intensified Ukrainian campaign to obtain religious independence and thereby reduce the influence of the ROC, which plays a key role in the Kremlin's identity politics in the region. This development could have wide-reaching implications. Such a blow to the ROC undermines the Kremlin's 'soft' spiritual influence. The Kremlin views the development as a question of national security and is unlikely to accept the defeat without resistance. The issue is expected to play a prominent role in the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine. In a wider context — reflecting Moscow's nexus between geopolitics and religion — the decision of the ROC to sever ties with Constantinople in response to the decision to grant the OCU autocephaly could mark the beginning of a wider rift in the Orthodox world. Moscow appears to be exerting pressure on other Orthodox patriarchates to sever ties with Constantinople.
650		0	_93690 _aReligión
650		0	_91073 _aGeopolítica
651		0	_91541 _aUcrania
651		0	_91448 _aRusia
710			_93871 _aParlamento Europeo
856	4		_uhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635525/EPRS_BRI(2019)635525_EN.pdf
942			_2udc _cBK _kBoletín UE _mFebrero 2019