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020 _a978-92-9198-850-1
022 _a1683-4917
024 _2doi
_a10.2815/672270
040 _cES-MaBCA
100 _914361
_aPawlak, Patryk
100 _916300
_aBiersteker, Thomas
245 _aGuardian of the Galaxy
_b: EU cyber sanctions and norms in cyberspace
_h[Recurso electrónico] PDF
260 _aParis
_bEuropean Union Insitute for Security Studies
_bISS
_cOctober 2019
300 _aRecurso Online, 105 p.
_g11 MB
490 _aChaillot Paper
_v155
_x1683-4917
520 _aCyberspace is not an ungoverned space. Existing international law and accepted norms of responsible behaviour provide clear guidance on what is and what is not permissible in cyberspace. And yet, states increasingly rely on cyber operations to achieve their political objectives and strategic goals: whether through industrial cyber-espionage to give competitive advantage to domestic companies, sophisticated operations to steal military secrets, or blatant attacks targeting the critical infrastructure of other states. This widespread sense of impunity has driven the European Union and its member states to support regional and global efforts to ensure that the perpetrators of the attacks face the consequences and that their victims are adequately protected and compensated. The so-called Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox adopted by the EU in 2017 provided a significant boost to the Union’s goal of becoming a ‘forward-looking cyber player’. In addition to a number of diplomatic and operational measures, the toolbox proposed the use of sanctions as one of the instruments at the Union’s disposal. This Chaillot Paper – which uses space exploration as a metaphor to demystify some of the concepts and challenges linked to cyber-related policymaking – focuses on the EU’s cyber sanctions regime as established by Council Decision 2019/797 and Council Regulation 2019/796. The EU’s autonomous cyber sanctions regime – encompassing measures such as travel bans and asset freezes – represents a significant achievement on the EU’s path to promote a free, open and secure cyberspace and defend the rules-based international order. However, the growing complexity of cyber threats and the proliferation of malicious actors intent on undermining the EU’s global standing, as well as its economic power and political foundations, suggest that it is not yet the time for self-congratulation. Taking account of the lessons derived from other sanctions regimes adopted by the EU in the past, this Chaillot Paper addresses a number of key issues relevant for ensuring the maximum effectiveness of the EU’s cyber sanctions regime: 1. Clarity about the logic behind the use of cyber sanctions; 2. Potential impact of the sanctions on the EU’s overall bilateral relations, and their interplay with other foreign and security policy instruments; 3. Objectives that specific listings aim to achieve; 4. Adequate timing and longevity of the listings; 5. Understanding of the target; 6. Sufficient capabilities and resources; 7. Mechanisms for coordination and information sharing; 8. Cooperation and coordination with international partners; 9. Engagement with the private sector; 10. Clear strategic communication. In tackling these questions, the contributors to this publication provide insights into a number of complicated issues of a political and legal nature, including the challenges of attribution, state responsibility in cyberspace, the principle of due diligence or the potential impact of cyber sanctions on the physical world. The analysis concludes with a set of proposals aimed at stimulating the discussion about the implementation of the EU cyber sanctions regime – and which will hopefully lead to concrete actions.
650 0 _915565
_aSanciones internacionales
650 0 _916301
_aCibernética
650 0 _96228
_aTecnología de la información -
651 0 _91574
_aPaíses de la Unión Europea
710 _9722
_aInstitute for Security Studies
856 4 _uhttps://biblioteca.guardiacivil.es/cgi-bin/koha/opac-retrieve-file.pl?id=903bfc9bd43282619c347dbaf91df643
_q*DESCARGAR PDF*
942 _2ddc
_cBK
_kBoletín UE
_moctober 2019